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Shoemaker and Noonan appealed to indeterminacy of denotation
as a way to save LEM in light of vague identity statements. By the
Shoemaker-Noonan position, if V and '6' determinately denote
objects, then
1̂  it is true that either a = b or a ¥= b; and
2) it is either true that a = b or true that d=£b.
If this appeal had worked, we could have said that the objects
weren't indeterminately identical, the statements were indeter-
minate due to an indeterminacy of denotation. In the present
section I have tried to save LEM by distinguishing between LEM
and PBV and arguing that (1) can be true even though (2) is false.
The explanation of vague identity statements lies neither in the
LEM-violating indeterminacy of the objects referred to in these
statements nor in the indeterminacy of the denotation of certain
components of these statements, but in our failure to draw a sharp
line between what counts as part of the same object and what
doesn't.1
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1 I wish to thank Chris Swoyer for many valuable discussions on the topic of vague
identity.
ON SETS AND WORLDS: A REPLY TO MENZEL
By PATRICK GRIM
IN [4] I offered a Cantorian argument that there can be no set ofall truths, and noted one application: against an approach to
possible worlds in terms of maximal consistent sets of propositions.
Shortly thereafter Selmer Bringsjord offered a similar argument
against set-theoretical worlds in [1].
In [7], a recent and important contribution to the discussion,
Christopher Menzel has raised a number of critical points regarding
Bringsjord's argument. But these points also apply against my
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I
There cannot, it appears, be a set of all truths. For essentially the
same Cantorian reasons, it seems, there can be neither world-stories
nor worlds construed as maximal consistent sets of propositions.
But perhaps there can be a non-set something-else of all truths,
or a non-set something-else appropriate to the propositions of a
world-story or a world.
Menzel does ultimately have such a something-else to offer. He
first considers and rejects, however, what may seem the obvious
candidate: the proper classes of Von Neumann-Bernays-Godel
(VNBG) and similar systems.
In [7] as in [8] Menzel deftly distinguishes two conditions on
proper classes: excessive size and unbounded rank.1 It is the second
he takes as the 'true conceptual boundary' between sets and proper
classes. If propositions are admitted as urelements, however, a
world-story S will be of bounded rank:
since . . . propositions for the world-story theorist are not sets, they
themselves have no members and so have a rank of 0; hence, S itself has
a rank of 1, i.e. S is bounded, ([7], p. 70)
There is then no need to consign world-stories (or a totality of
truths) to the realm of proper classes. Or so the argument goes.
Note however that Menzel's 'ranks' here are confined exclusively
to sets: it is sets alone which have ranks, determined exclusively by
the ranks of their members. But this may be a dangerously pro-
vincial view of rank. Hierarchies of types have of course often been
thought necessary for propositions, predicates, and properties as
well as sets, and in the end an integrated theory of types may be
required. We may find it necessary to rank sets of propositions
above those sets mentioned in propositions they include, for
example.2 But given an integrated ranking of this sort Menzel's
argument fails to go through. It is no longer clear, in particular,
that world-stories will have a rank either of 1 or of any other
bounded n.
Nonetheless there are strong reasons to think that Menzel's
conclusion here is right: that proper classes won't do as a some-
thing-else appropriate to world-stories or a totality of truths.
1 Within VNBG proper classes are those too large to be sets. Menzel defines the rank
of an object recursively as the least ordinal greater than the ranks of all its members. A
class is unbounded if it contains members of arbitrarily high rank.
2 This would seem the obvious way to deal with the following variant of Russell's
paradox, for example:
Some sets of propositions contain propositions which mention those sets themselves.
Some sets of propositions contain no such propositions. We will refer to the latter as
'non-self-mentioning' propositional sets.
Consider now the set S of all propositions which mention only non-self-mentioning
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Some of the objections to proper classes are technical. Within
VNBG and similar systems, for example, proper classes are kept
immune from Cantorian arguments only at the cost of sacrificing
general provability for instances of the induction schema (see for
example [6] p. 198).
Intuitive objections are even stronger, however. For in VNBG
and similar systems proper classes are introduced precisely as classes
which are not members of further (even finite) classes. That would
clearly not seem to hold for either a 'class of all truths' or for
classes appropriate to world-stories. For surely a class of all truths
would be a member of further classes — of various classes of prop-
ositional classes and various classes of classes of truths. Surely a
class of all truths would form a pair with a class of all falsehoods,
for example. Worlds and their world-stories would seem if anything
less amenable to treatment as proper classes. For consider the class
of worlds in which I exist and the class of worlds in which this
vase is hit with a hammer. Current philosophical use quite generaUy
seems to demand classes of possible worlds.
II
The 'something-else' that Menzel ultimately suggests involves a
recourse not to amplified but to amputated set theories. Perhaps
the world-story theorist, though clearly a profligate realist regarding
propositions, can follow an abstemiously constructivist line when it
comes to sets:
By adopting ZF-Power (or some similarly conservative set theory), then,
and adjusting it appropriately to allow for the existence of large sets (and
urelements), the world-story theorist is free to postulate the existence of
his world-stories without fear of paradox, at least by way of [the
Cantorian] argument; for that argument depends essentially on there
being a power set of the world-story S; but there is simply no way of
generating the full classical power set of an infinite set in ZF-Power . . .
([7],P. 71)
It is far from clear, however, that large sets within ZF-Po-wer will
prove any more satisfactory here than proper classes.
Not too surprisingly, sacrifice of the power set axiom results in
quite major technical limitations; at one blow we are effectively
exiled from Cantor's paradise (some surprising technical limitations
of ZF-Power appear in [10]). Nor does ZF-Power applied as Menzel
envisages it really seem to satisfy constructivist scruples. Menzel
relies on the fact that 'there is simply no way of generating the full
classical power set of an infinite set in ZF-power . . . ' But of course
there is no way of generating basic infinite sets within ZF-Power at
all; they must be added by fiat of special axiom. The set of zero and
its successors appears by axiom within ZF, and a set of all ordinals






/analysis/article/46/4/186/160951 by guest on 24 February 2021
ON SETS AND WORLDS: A REPLY TO MENZEL 189
include the reals, and world-stories, and infinite sets of world-
stories within ZF-Power we will need special axiomatic provision
for these as well — a prodigal postulation of sets far from con-
structivist in spirit.
It is not clear, moreover, that sacrifice of the power set axiom
alone will be enough to escape Cantorian difficulties regarding a
set of all truths. For consider the following argument.
Let us suppose we did have a set T of all truths within ZF-Power.
Then by the axiom schema of separation, carried over directly from
ZF, we would have as a subset of T a set of all truths satisfying a
particular condition B(x). As long as our basic language is rich
enough to express the notion that a truth t is about a topic c, it
appears, one such condition will be lx is about a set of truths.' By
separation, then, we would have a set C of all truths about sets of
truths.
More formally, using 'Axy' to indicate that x is about y, our
condition *x is about a set of truths' is:
3yVz(z eyDzET-8c Axy).
The axiom schema of separation, taken directly from ZF, is
x Sy = x <=a8cB(x)),
where zx, ..., zn are the free variables of B(x) other than x, and the
only restriction on B(x) is that it does not contain y as a free
variable (see for example [6] p. 175). Using T fora in this schema
and our condition above for B(x) would give us a set C of all truths
about sets of truths:
z(z EyDzET- 8c Axy)).
The existence of a set C, however, would give us a reductio.
C would, in particular, be larger than T. For consider any one-to-
one function / from T into C, mapping truths onto truths con-
cerning sets of truths, and consider further a set c of all truths
which do not belong to the sets their assigned element is about.
Here using 'a(/(x))' to indicate the set (or union of sets) f(x) is
about,
xGc' =x£T8cx<£a(f(x)).
Clearly C will contain some truth about c just as it contains some
truth regarding any set of truths. But by familiar reasoning / can
assign no element of T to any truth about c . C is larger than T.
One branch of the reductio, then, is this: given a set T of all
truths, it appears, there would be a subset C larger than the set T
of which it is a subset.3
3 Note that this is not a problem for sets in ZF-Power in general; the argument above
relies essentially on the supposition that T is a set of all truths.
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Another branch is this. Each element of C is a truth. There are
thus more truths than elements of T, and thus T cannot, as
assumed, be a set of all truths. A similar argument would of course
apply to world-stories.
In order to escape the Cantorian difficulties of C, it appears,
something more would have to be sacrificed — something above
and beyond the power set axiom. Perhaps additional restrictions
on the axiom schema of separation are called for. Perhaps the
language of the system must exclude or restrict the notion of truths
about sets of truths — though since there clearly are truths about
any sets of truths this would seem far from satisfactory. Or perhaps
here again we should simply conclude that there is no set T of all
truths.
Ill
Variations on the Cantorian argument can be used to show that
there is no set of all necessary truths, no set of all falsehoods, no
set of all propositions, and no set of all things known by an
omniscient being (see also [3] and [5]). If extensions are construed
standardly in terms of sets, 'true', 'false', 'necessary', and 'is a
proposition' have no extensions. Since the conjunction of a neces-
sary and a contingent proposition is itself contingent, moreover,
the argument can also be adapted to show there is no set of all
contingent truths or falsehoods.4 Nor is there any need to interpret
the argument as restricted to linguistic entities in any sense; the
argument would be the same against a set of all facts or all states of
affairs.
In a concluding caveat, however, Menzel appeals to two outlines
of possible worlds which appear to escape Cantorian arguments.
One of these is Plantinga's:
a state of affairs S is complete or maximal if for every state of affairs S',
S includes S or precludes S . And a possible world is simply a possible
state of affairs that is maximal. ([9], p. 45)
The other is Menzel's own:
A world-story [could] be a set S that is maximal in the sense that for any
proposition q, S entails (but not necessarily contains) either q or its
negation, but not both . . . ( [7 ] , p. 72)
4 In the standard argument (as in [4]) we envisage a necessary truth corresponding to
each element of the power set Here we envisage the conjunction of each of these with a
chosen contingent proposition.
It appears that even a set of all atomic propositions will fall victim. For suppose a set
A of all atomic propositions and a set C of all connectives. Within classical atomism
compounds from these will give us all propositions. If A and C are sets, however, by
standard principles of set theory all permutations of elements of A sprinkled with
permutations of elements of C will also form a set. We know independently that there
can be no set of all propositions, however, and thus by modus tollens it appears there can
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Do these approaches offer an escape from Cantorian difficulties
of sets and worlds?
That is unclear. Menzel's outline demands universal quantifica-
tion over propositions, Plantinga's calls for quantification over all
states of affairs, and it appears that any genuine explication of the
notion of 'maximality' crucial to possible worlds must be similarly
quantificational in form. The lingering difficulty here is the follow-
ing. By our Cantorian arguments there can be neither a set of all
propositions nor a set of all states of affairs. But the only real
semantics for quantification we have is in terms of sets.5
State University of New York, ©PATRICK GRIM 1986
Stony Brook, NY 11794, U.S.A.
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